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PRAYING FOR CLARITY: LUND, BORMUTH, AND 
THE SPLIT OVER LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
Abstract: On September 6, 2017, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit released its opinion in Bormuth v. County of Jackson, finding prayers of-
fered by the Jackson County Board of Commissioners constitutional under the Es-
tablishment Clause. That decision involved detailed factual analysis, which varied 
greatly from the analysis used by the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit to find nearly identical prayers by the Rowan County Board of Commis-
sioners unconstitutional in Lund v. Rowan County on July 14, 2017. This Comment 
argues that the method of analysis conducted by the en banc Fourth Circuit in Lund 
is the more comprehensive and, therefore proper, method of factual analysis con-
templated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Town of Greece v. Galloway. In contrast, 
the analysis employed by the en banc Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bormuth fails to 
fully consider the challenged practice, and is therefore flawed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Rowan County Board of Commissioners has opened its public meet-
ings with prayers for at least forty-six years.1 In 2013, three citizens of Rowan 
County filed suit against their Board of Commissioners challenging those pray-
ers.2 In Lund v. Rowan County (“Lund I”), the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of North Carolina determined that the prayers in Rowan County violated 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3 On appeal, the U.S. Court of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Minutes of the Meeting of the Bd. of Rowan Cty. Comm’rs 1 (Mar. 1, 1971) (detailing, in 
the Rowan County Board’s oldest publically available minutes, the opening of a board meeting with 
prayer). The history of legislative prayer in the United States as a whole dates back as far the founding 
of the country, with its roots in the practices of colonial governing bodies. See infra notes 45–48 and 
accompanying text (providing detailed history of legislative prayer in the Unites States). The Rowan 
County Board of Commissioners is the body in charge of the government of Rowan County, which is 
located in central North Carolina. See Lund v. Rowan County (Lund I), 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 714 
(M.D.N.C. 2015) (identifying the Board of Commissioners’ role as the body through which the county 
“exercises its powers as a governmental entity”). 
 2 Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 715. The plaintiffs in Lund I, Nancy Lund, Liesa Montag-Siegel, and 
Robert Voekler, are all non-Christian residents of Rowan County. Verified Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief and Nominal Damages ¶¶ 8–13, Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712 (No. 1:13-CV-
00207). The Lund plaintiffs have attended meetings of the Rowan County Board of Commissioners 
for various reasons, some since the early 2000s. See id. ¶¶ 8, 10, 12 (detailing Lund’s attendance at 
meetings since 2004, Montag-Siegel’s attendance at meetings since the early 2000s, and Voekler’s 
attendance at meetings to follow “the Board’s consideration of educational issues”). 
 3 Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 712, 734. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment pro-
vides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. For a more detailed explanation of the trial proceedings in Lund I, see infra notes 26–29 and 
accompanying text. 
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit subsequently reversed Lund I in Lund v. Rowan 
County (“Lund II”), finding the prayers constitutional.4 The en banc Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals then reviewed the case and found the prayers unconstitu-
tional in Lund v. Rowan County (“Lund III”).5 
Five months after the Lund plaintiffs filed suit, Peter Bormuth, a citizen of 
Jackson County, Michigan, filed suit against his county, alleging that the coun-
ty’s nearly identical practice of opening the Board of Commissioners’ meetings 
with prayers was unconstitutional.6 In Bormuth v. County of Jackson (“Bormuth 
I”), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found Jackson 
County’s prayer practice constitutional.7 Jackson County then appealed, and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Bormuth I, and found Jack-
son County’s prayers unconstitutional in Bormuth v. County of Jackson 
(“Bormuth II”).8 The en banc Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals then vacated 
Bormuth II, and found the prayers constitutional.9 
The current split between the Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals 
over the proper analysis of challenges to legislator-led prayers raises concerns of 
judicial consistency in an area with far-reaching implications.10 Alterations to the 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Lund v. Rowan County (Lund II), 837 F.3d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2016). For a more detailed expla-
nation of the circuit-level proceedings in Lund, see infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text. 
 5 Lund v. Rowan County (Lund III), 863 F.3d 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). En banc refers 
to the practice of U.S. Courts of Appeals reviewing a case with every member present. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 46(c) (2012) (outlining normal practice of U.S. Courts of Appeals hearing cases in panels of three, 
and enabling en banc review by a larger selection of judges); En Banc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining en banc as “[w]ith all judges present and participating”); see also En Banc 
Sitting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “en banc sitting” as “[a] court session in 
which all the judges . . . participate”). 
 6 Bormuth v. County of Jackson (Bormuth II), 849 F.3d 266, 271 (6th Cir. 2017). Mr. Bormuth is 
a pagan resident of Jackson County, who began attending meetings of the County of Jackson Board of 
Commissioners after becoming concerned about pollution of a local river. Plaintiff’s Amended Com-
plaint at ¶ 13, Bormuth v. County of Jackson (Bormuth I), 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2015) 
(No. 2:13-CV-13726). The Jackson County Board of Commissioners is the government entity in 
charge of Jackson County, a county in southern Michigan. See Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269 (identify-
ing Board of Commissioners as presiding over government meetings, and conducting government 
business). 
 7 Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 850, 860. The Bormuth I court considered facts that weighed for 
and against a finding of coercion, including the lack of chastisement of dissenters, the ability of dis-
senters to leave or abstain, the purely Christian nature of the prayers, the instruction from Commis-
sioners to participate in the prayers, as well as other factors. See id. at 857–58 (weighing those fac-
tors). 
 8 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 291. 
 9 Bormuth v. County of Jackson (Bormuth III), 870 F.3d 494, 497–99 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 10 See Patrick L. Gregory, Circuit Split on Legislator-Led Prayer Could Entice Supreme Court, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/circuit-split-legislatorled-n57982087849/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y6LF-K7ZJ] (noting the direct disagreement between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
over the extent of Town of Greece v. Galloway, and the likelihood of review by the Supreme Court 
given the importance of the right at stake). See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bormuth v. 
County of Jackson, No. 17-7220 (Dec. 21, 2017) (detailing Mr. Bormuth’s request for further appel-
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standard for judging legislative prayers would have profound effects on prayers 
currently offered at the state and local level across the country.11 
Part I of this Comment examines the factual and procedural backgrounds of 
both Lund and Bormuth.12 Part II discusses the historical practices surrounding 
the Establishment Clause, as well as the currently murky status of the law defin-
ing the prohibitions of the Clause.13 Finally, Part III argues that the analysis em-
ployed by the Fourth Circuit in Lund III is more faithful to Establishment Clause 
precedent, and therefore more correct, than that used by the Sixth Circuit in 
Bormuth III.14 
I. THE COUNTIES’ PRAYER PRACTICES AND ENSUING LITIGATION 
The county governments of Rowan County, North Carolina and Jackson 
County, Michigan are both led by a Board of Commissioners.15 The chairpersons 
of both Boards open their public meetings by calling the meetings to order and 
then announcing that everyone should rise for prayer.16 Members of the Boards, 
all of whom are Christian, then led the attendants in overwhelmingly Christian 
                                                                                                                           
late review); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rowan County v. Lund, No. 17-565 (Oct. 12, 2017) (de-
tailing Rowan County’s request for further appellate review). 
 11 See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan and Twenty-One Other States in Support of Jack-
son County and Affirmance at 9–11, Bormuth II, 849 F.3d 266 (No. 15-1869) (detailing a 2002 study 
finding thirty-one state legislative bodies that employ legislative prayers in some capacity, and a sepa-
rate study of counties within the Sixth Circuit finding that at least 26.9% of the counties in Michigan, 
Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky have legislator-led prayers before some of their county government 
meetings); Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 12 Other States Supporting Defendant-
Appellant at 15, add. 2–8, Lund II, 837 F.3d 407 (No. 15-1591) (detailing the practice of legislator-led 
prayers in at least one chamber in thirty-seven of the United States’ fifty-six state, territorial, and 
district governments, and finding that at least 52% of the counties in the Fourth Circuit used legisla-
tor-led prayers on some occasions at some county government meetings); see, e.g., Cory Vaillancourt, 
In Whose Name? Haywood Commissioners Asking for Trouble in Prayer Case, SMOKY MOUNTAIN 
NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.smokymountainnews.com/news/item/20475-in-who-s-name-
haywood-commissioners-asking-for-trouble-in-prayer-case [https://perma.cc/PA9N-R3S9] (detailing 
change of prayer practice by the Board of Commissioners in Haywood County, North Carolina, in 
light of Lund III resulting in prayers that “didn’t even attempt to comply with the [Lund III] ruling”). 
 12 See infra notes 15–41 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 42–72 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 73–86 and accompanying text. 
 15 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269. Both boards are elected by the people of 
their counties, and are led by a chairperson. Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269. 
Both boards also hold public meetings to conduct business and accept public comments. Lund III, 863 
F.3d at 272; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269. The Rowan County Board of Commissioners holds two 
meetings each month, whereas the Jackson County Board of Commissioners meets once each month. 
Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269. 
 16 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269. The chairperson of the Jackson County 
Board also occasionally tells those at the meeting to “assume a reverent position.” Bormuth II, 849 
F.3d at 269. 
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prayers.17 Following the prayers given by the Commissioners, both Boards pro-
ceed to the formal business part of the meeting.18 The plaintiffs in both Bormuth 
I and Lund I became concerned after attending a number of meetings that started 
with prayers.19 Both sets of plaintiffs raised their concerns to their Board of 
Commissioners informally prior to filing suit.20 Mr. Bormuth’s verbal opposition 
to the prayers at the Jackson County Board’s August meeting was met with nega-
tive reactions from board members during the meeting.21 Members of the Jack-
son County Board also made numerous statements to the local press denigrating 
both the lawsuit and Mr. Bormuth.22 The Lund plaintiffs raised their concerns via 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Lund III, 863 F.3d at 273, 283 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 
3d at 714) (noting that two members of the Board of Commissioners are Methodist, and three are 
some variety of Baptist and that over a five and a half year period, 97% of the prayers offered mentioned 
“Jesus, Christ, or Savior”) ; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 270 (detailing two prayers thanking a “Heavenly 
father” in “Jesus’s name[,]” and concluding with “Amen”). No other religions were ever represented 
in prayers, and the prayers often featured implications that Christianity is the superior religion, and 
that the public should become Christian. See Lund III, 863 F.3d at 273 (detailing prayers calling 
Christianity “the only way to eternal life,” and asking “that [the public] may be one with [God]”); 
Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 714 (finding that “[n]o invocation delivered since November 5, 2007, ref-
erenced a deity specific to a faith other than Christianity”). 
 18 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269. Following its prayers, the Board of 
Commissioners in both counties discuss matters of public import, and elicit comments and concerns 
from the citizens in attendance. See Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272 (detailing the practice in Rowan County 
of following the prayers with the Pledge of Allegiance, approval of the prior meetings’ minutes, 
scheduling, and receiving public comment); Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269–70 (outlining the general 
practice in Jackson County of discussing public matters, and the specific discussions of County policy 
regarding possession of firearms by county employees on county property). 
 19 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 273; Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 270. In July and August 2013, Mr. Bormuth 
attended the Board of Commissioners’ public meetings, which were both opened with prayers that 
thanked a “heavenly father[,]” were given in “Jesus’s name[,]” and concluded with “amen.” Bormuth II, 
849 F.3d at 270. Those prayers made Mr. Bormuth uncomfortable, and made him feel that he was being 
forced to participate in a religion in order to appear before his local government. Id. Similarly, every 
board meeting that the Lund plaintiffs attended started with prayers. See Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 
715 (detailing those allegations in Mr. Bormuth’s complaint). All of the Lund plaintiffs indicated that 
the prayers made them feel excluded from their community and its government, and that they felt 
coerced to join in the prayers. Id. 
 20 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 270; Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 714. During the Rowan County Board’s 
August 2013 meeting, Mr. Bormuth raised his concerns about the prayer practice. Bormuth II, 849 F.3d 
at 270. The Lund plaintiffs raised their concerns to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
North Carolina, which wrote a letter informing Rowan County that the prayers offered before meetings 
were violations of the Establishment Clause. Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 714. The ACLU is “a national 
organization whose primary purpose is to help enforce and preserve individual rights and liberties 
guaranteed by federal and state constitutions.” American Civil Liberties Union, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The letter indicated that the prayers were unconstitutional under then-valid 
Fourth Circuit precedent, which held that sectarian prayer was unconstitutional. Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 
3d at 714 n.3 (citing Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1821 (2014)). 
 21 See Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 270–71 (detailing reactions by a board member, including disgust-
ed facial expressions and “refus[al] to look at [Mr.] Bormuth” while he spoke). 
 22 See id. at 283, 286 (quoting a member of the Board explaining that only board members were 
allowed to pray in order to control the prayers’ message, calling the lawsuit “political correctness 
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a letter from the ACLU of North Carolina, and faced similar comments from 
members of the Rowan Board.23 When both Boards indicated their unwilling-
ness to change practices, the plaintiffs filed suit.24 
A. Lund’s Procedural History 
The Lund plaintiffs filed suit in March 2013 and sought a preliminary in-
junction, alleging that Rowan County’s prayer practice was a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.25 The district court granted the preliminary injunction 
based on then-standing Fourth Circuit precedent that sectarian prayers were un-
constitutional.26 After the district court issued its preliminary injunction, the U.S. 
Supreme Court announced its decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway.27 The 
parties then cross-motioned for summary judgment in light of Town of Greece, 
and the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion, finding the prayers unconsti-
tutional.28 The district court found the prayers distinguishable from those at issue 
in Town of Greece, and determined that the prayers were coercive, as defined by 
the plurality’s test in Town of Greece.29 Rowan County then appealed the district 
                                                                                                                           
nonsense” being “jammed down [his] throat,” saying that it was an “attack on Christianity and Jesus 
Christ,” and calling Mr. Bormuth a “nitwit”). 
 23 See Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 714–15 (detailing comments by a member of the Rowan County 
Board of Commissioners indicating his intent to continue praying before meetings, while another 
stated he would be willing to go to jail rather than stop “pray[ing] in JESUS name”). 
 24 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 270–71; Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 714–15. 
 25 Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 715–16. Preliminary injunctions are among the most immediate 
types of relief that can be sought by a party because they are issued before a trial has been conducted. 
See Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining preliminary injunction as “a 
temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring 
before the court has a chance to decide the case”). 
 26 Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 716. The district court based its decision on Joyner, which as previ-
ously noted, dictated a per se ban on sectarian legislative prayers, but has since been abrogated. See 
Joyner, 653 F.3d at 340; Per Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining per se as “of, 
in, or by itself; standing alone, without reference to additional facts” or “as a matter of law”); supra 
note 20 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the Joyner decision and its abrogation by 
Town of Greece). 
 27 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 274. Town of Greece is instrumental in Lund and Bormuth for two reasons: 
first, the case substantially altered the governing law, and second, the case was decided during the trial 
court proceedings in both Lund I and Bormuth I. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822; see Bormuth II, 849 
F. 3d at 271 (identifying that Town of Greece was decided after filing, but before decision on Mr. 
Bormuth’s first summary judgment motion); Lund II, 837 F. 3d at 412 (noting that Town of Greece was 
decided after the district court issued a preliminary injunction, but before the parties cross-motioned for 
summary judgment). 
 28 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 274. Summary judgment motions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56, and are granted when the party moving for summary judgment shows that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56. 
 29 See Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 724, 727 (noting the distinguishing facts between Lund and 
Town of Greece, and employing the Town of Greece plurality’s test). The court also addressed coer-
cion through other Supreme Court precedent prior to Town of Greece, finding the prayers equally 
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court’s ruling to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed the district court, and found 
the prayers constitutional.30 The Fourth Circuit specifically noted that the pray-
ers at issue did not fall beyond the scope of historic prayers, and were not coer-
cive under the Town of Greece plurality’s test.31 The Lund plaintiffs subsequently 
made a motion for rehearing on the basis of the importance of the matter, which 
was granted en banc.32 The en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling, agreeing that the prayers in Rowan County were unconstitutional.33 
B. Bormuth’s Procedural History 
Mr. Bormuth filed suit against Jackson County in August of 2013 in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that Jackson 
County’s prayer practice was unconstitutional.34 Mr. Bormuth then moved for 
summary judgment, but before the court ruled on that motion, the United States 
Supreme Court released its decision in Town of Greece.35 Jackson County then 
cross-motioned for summary judgment, and the district court allowed Mr. 
Bormuth to file a new summary judgment motion in light of Town of Greece.36 
                                                                                                                           
coercive under those standards. See id. at 729–33 (addressing “the Coercion Doctrine pre-Town of 
Greece[,]” and finding the prayers coercive under those tests as well). 
 30 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 274. 
 31 See Lund II, 837 F.3d at 418–19, 427–28 (explaining that the prayers did not go beyond the 
legislator-led prayers that had existed in the United States since 1775, and noting that the prayers did 
not require participation, chastise non-participants, or incur consequences to non-participants). 
 32 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 275; Lund v. Rowan County, 670 F. App’x 106, 106 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(granting rehearing en banc and vacating Lund II); Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing en banc 
at 1, Lund III, 863 F.3d 268 (No. 15-1591). A motion for rehearing is a post-determination motion to 
the court, allowed in appellate cases to seek rehearing by a panel, or en banc. FED. R. APP. P. 35, 40; 
see Motion for Rehearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining term as “a party’s 
request that the court allow another hearing of a case, motion, or appeal, usually to consider an alleged 
error or omission in the court’s judgment or opinion”). The Lund plaintiffs also argued that the panel 
decision failed to perform the “content-sensitive analysis mandated by Town of Greece,” and essen-
tially found “nearly all legislative prayer practices beyond review” as the first circuit court to apply 
Town of Greece. Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing en banc, supra, at 2. 
 33 Lund III, 863 F.3d at 275. 
 34 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 271. The complaint was later amended to add more Establishment 
Clause claims after Mr. Bormuth’s application to serve as the County’s Solid Waste Planning Commis-
sioner was denied. Id. 
 35 Id. Although the district court did not agree with Jackson County that it should delay ruling on the 
motion until after the Court’s ruling in Town of Greece, it did not rule on the plaintiff’s motion until after 
the Court’s decision was released. Id. 
 36 Id. Mr. Bormuth was permitted to file a renewed motion for summary judgment in light of 
Town of Greece based on the fact that Town of Greece made clear that the constitutionality of legisla-
tive prayer did not depend on whether the prayer was sectarian. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 
1820 (noting that requiring prayers to be nonsectarian “is not consistent with the tradition of legisla-
tive prayer outlined in the [Supreme] Court’s cases”); Order Terminating Motion, Bormuth II, 116 F. 
Supp. 3d 850 (2:13-cv-13726) (terminating Mr. Bormuth’s first summary judgment motion to allow 
briefing in light of Town of Greece). Compare Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 9–10, 
Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (2:13-cv-13726), ECF No. 14 (arguing for summary judgment based 
on the Christian nature of the prayers in Jackson County), with Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judg-
110 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
The parties’ motions were heard before a magistrate judge, who recommended 
that the district court grant Mr. Bormuth’s motion on the ground that the county’s 
prayers violated the Establishment Clause.37 The district court rejected the Mag-
istrate Judge’s recommendation, finding the County’s prayer practice constitu-
tionally permissible.38 Mr. Bormuth appealed the district court’s ruling to the 
Sixth Circuit, which reversed the decision and found the County’s prayer prac-
tice unconstitutional.39 A member of the Sixth Circuit then sua sponte requested 
that the case be reheard en banc, and a majority of the justices voted to rehear the 
case.40 The en banc Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion, finding Jackson County’s prayer practice constitutional.41 
II. TESTING THE EXTENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE’S PROHIBITIONS 
The U.S. Supreme Court has directly addressed legislative prayers in only 
two cases: Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway.42 That limited 
precedent highlights the importance of historical practices, while also consider-
                                                                                                                           
ment, supra, at 11–12, ECF No. 37 (arguing, based on Town of Greece, for summary judgment the 
fact that the prayers were delivered by Commissioners rather than a paid chaplain). 
 37 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 272. U.S. magistrate judges are Article I judges, appointed for eight 
year terms, with the power to hear pretrial motions and preside over civil and criminal misdemeanor 
trials. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012) (outlining duties of a U.S. magistrate judge); United States Magis-
trate Judge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (specifying that magistrate judges are ap-
pointed to eight year terms). Magistrate judges, however, do not have the power to issue rulings on 
summary judgment motions or certain other dispositive motions, and in those cases must submit a 
report and recommendation to the district judge assigned to the case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
 38 Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 860. In his Report and Recommendation, the judge specifically 
noted at length the significance of the Jackson County Commissioners’ practice of limiting the prayer 
givers to Commissioners, as well as asking the public to public to aid in the selection of the County’s 
prayers, unconstitutional. See Report and Recommendation: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
(Dkt. 25, 37) at 36–39, Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 3d 850 (2:13-CV-13726), ECF No. 50 (distinguishing 
the facts of Bormuth from those in Town of Greece). The district court judge rejected the recommen-
dation and the contention that the constitutionality of prayers should turn on the identity of the prayer 
giver, finding that the prayers at issue would have been constitutional if delivered by an invitee of the 
Board. See Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 858–59 (finding unpersuasive arguments that board mem-
bers’ delivery of the prayers made them coercive). The judge also explicitly rejected the analysis em-
ployed by the court in Lund I as to whether the prayers fell outside traditional legislative prayers, and 
whether the prayers were coercive. Id. at 856–57. 
 39 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 273, 291. The court specifically examined the significance of the pray-
er-giver’s identity as a Commissioner, the fact that the Commissioners instructed participation in the 
prayers, that they attacked Mr. Bormuth because of his opposition to the prayers, and that an adverse 
appointment decision was made against him following his lawsuit. Id. at 285–87. 
 40 Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 499 (citing Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 855 F.3d 694, 694 (6th Cir. 
2017) (granting en banc review and vacating Bormuth II)). Sua sponte refers to the judicial practice of 
judges either raising issues, or taking action, on their own without any action required of the parties. 
See Sua Sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining sua sponte as “[w]ithout 
prompting or suggestion; on its own motion”). 
 41 Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 519. 
 42 See Bormuth II, 849 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that “[t]here are only two Supreme 
Court cases that have considered the constitutionality of legislative prayer[s]”). 
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ing coercion without clearly addressing how it fits within the constitutional anal-
ysis.43 The varying opinions in Lund and Bormuth illustrate the unclear standard 
left by the Supreme Court in Town of Greece, the most recent case involving 
legislative prayers.44 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Deference to History in  
Establishment Clause Analysis 
In Marsh, the Supreme Court traced the origins of legislative prayer back to 
Colonial America, where the practice of convening legislative bodies with pray-
ers was commonplace throughout the colonies.45 The Supreme Court also noted 
the presence of prayers in the earliest meetings of the U.S. Congress.46 Those 
early legislative prayers were rooted in the days of a state-sponsored religion 
under the British Empire.47 Following the overthrow of British rule, the Found-
ers included in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution a provi-
sion prohibiting the establishment of a religion by the government.48 Neverthe-
less, contemporaneous with the ratification of the First Amendment, both the 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (quoting County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)) (finding that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to histor-
ical practices and understandings’”). 
 44 See generally Bormuth III, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Lund III, 863 F.3d 268 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (en banc); Bormuth II, 849 F.3d 266; Lund II, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016); Bormuth I, 116 
F. Supp. 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712 (M.D.N.C. 2015). 
 45 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 n.5 (1983) (detailing practice of opening legislative 
sessions with prayers in Virginia as early as 1712, and Rhode Island in 1790). 
 46 Id. at 787. The Court noted that in 1774, the Continental Congress began paying a chaplain to 
open its sessions with prayers. Id. The first prayer offered by the Continental Congress’s chaplain was 
replete with Christian themes and was given in the name “of Jesus Christ, Thy Son and our Saviour.” 
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1823. 
 47 Marsh, 462 U.S. at 786–87. Throughout the period under British rule, various colonies main-
tained government support for religion beyond the basic requirements of adhering to the religion of 
the Church of England. See, e.g., LIONEL DE LEON, UNITED STATES FACTS AND DATES 1 (2008) 
(detailing a decree by the Governor of Virginia in 1617 stating “Every Person should go to church, 
Sundays and Holidays, or lye Neck and Heels that Night, and be a Slave to the Colony the following 
Week; for the second Offence, he should be a Slave for a Month; and for the third, a Year and a 
Day”). 
 48 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing that “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion . . .”). The First Amendment, and the Framer’s arguments for its ratification, is the 
consolidation and legislative pronouncement of the separation of church and state. See Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson, President of the U.S., to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, & Stephen S. Nel-
son, A Comm. of the Danbury Baptist Ass’n in the State of Conn. (Jan. 1, 1802) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress) (addressing concerns that Congress could strip religious liberties, stating “that act 
. . . which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
. . . [,]’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State[,]” ensured that Congress could not 
repeal religious liberty). 
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House and the Senate selected chaplains during the first Congress.49 Congress’s 
embrace of prayers has been mirrored by numerous states from the time of the 
Bill of Rights until the present.50 
The U.S. Supreme Court has gone to great lengths in its opinions analyzing 
the Establishment Clause to make clear that the historical practice detailed above 
is the cornerstone of that analysis.51 The Court has been equally clear that a his-
tory of uncorrected Constitutional violations alone is insufficient to allow con-
tinued violations to take place.52 The Court has therefore established a fine line 
between reverence to history and faithfulness to the First Amendment, which 
requires courts to look to historical practices to establish the Framers’ intent, 
without relying solely on those practices.53 
B. Establishment Clause Limits on Legislative Prayer  
Before Lund and Bormuth 
The Court’s first foray into legislative prayers arose out of the Nebraska 
Legislature’s hiring of a legislative chaplain.54 A legislator challenged the pray-
ers as a violation of the Establishment Clause, seeking to enjoin the prayers.55 In 
                                                                                                                           
 49 H.R. JOUR., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1826); S. JOUR., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1820). Congress 
subsequently enacted legislation to provide a salary of $500 per year for each chaplain of the Con-
gress. An Act for Allowing Compensation to the Members of the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States, and to the Officers of Both Houses, § 4, 1 Stat. 71 (1789). The language of 
the Bill of Rights was agreed upon three days after Congress authorized payment of the chaplains. 
H.R. JOUR., supra, at 121; S. JOUR., supra, at 88. 
 50 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 n.11, 794 n.18 (detailing the practice of legislative prayers during 
the 1980s in twenty-one states, and noting eleven states where legislative chaplain were paid from 
public funds during the 1980s). 
 51 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (explaining that the Establishment Clause inquiry requires a 
“determin[ation] whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long fol-
lowed in Congress and the state legislatures”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93 (analyzing prayer practices 
of legislature’s paid chaplain “against the historical background” of legislative prayers). 
 52 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (finding that “Marsh must not be understood as permit-
ting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation”); 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (finding that “[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary 
violations of constitutional guarantees”). 
 53 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (finding that “the Establishment Clause must be in-
terpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings’”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (describ-
ing the importance of contemporaneous adoption of the First Amendment and hiring of legislative 
chaplain as evidence of the Framers’ intent that the Establishment Clause not be a blanket prohibition 
of legislative prayers). 
 54 See Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 275 (noting that Marsh was the first case to address the issue). 
Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister, was selected as the Nebraska Legislature’s chaplain for sixteen 
consecutive years, beginning in 1965. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785. In addition to being selected to serve as 
chaplain by the Executive Board of the Legislative Council, Reverend Palmer was paid $319.75 per 
month from public funds. Id. at 784–85. 
 55 Id. at 785. The district court found the prayers themselves did not violate the Establishment 
Clause, but that the practice of paying the chaplain did. Id. After cross-appeals were filed, the Court of 
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its decision in Marsh, the Supreme Court specifically considered the fact that the 
legislative chaplain represented only one denomination, that the chaplain re-
ceived a salary from the government, and that the prayers were all Christian in 
nature.56 The Court found all three arguments insufficient to prohibit the prayer 
practice on constitutional grounds, and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s prior deci-
sion, finding the prayers constitutional.57 
Following the Court’s decision in Marsh, the Court did not address the 
practice of legislative prayers again until residents of Greece, New York chal-
lenged the town’s use of prayers to open town board meetings.58 The town of 
Greece had adopted a practice of opening its monthly town board meetings with 
prayers offered by a clergyman at the request of the town supervisor.59 The town 
selected the prayer givers, who were referred to as “chaplain for the month,” by 
calling local congregations until it found a minister willing to give the prayers.60 
Although the Board did not review the prayers or provide guidance as to their 
contents, nearly all of the ministers invited to give prayers were Christian.61 Two 
residents of the town brought suit seeking to force the town to allow only non-
sectarian prayers.62 The Supreme Court weighed arguments by the plaintiffs con-
                                                                                                                           
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test and found the practice wholly unconstitutional. 
See Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 233–35 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 615 (1971)) (noting that, per Lemon, the prayers had to be analyzed as a whole, and subsequently 
finding the prayers unconstitutional). The court of appeals specifically found the prayers’ purpose 
“must be to advance and give preference to one religious view over others,” that the effect of the 
prayers was “unmistakably to advance religion and to give preference to one religious view,” and that 
“[t]he prayer practice also entangles the state with religion . . . .” Id. at 234–35. 
 56 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93 (noting those three facts before specifically refuting the court of 
appeals’ finding that the prayers were unconstitutional on that basis). 
 57 Id. at 793–95. The Court specifically stated that the practice of appointing a chaplain of only 
one faith was not an Establishment Clause violation “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment 
stemmed from an impermissible motive,” that the manner in which the chaplain was paid did not 
conflict with the historical practice of legislative prayers, and that the Judeo-Christian nature of the 
prayers also did not violate the Establishment Clause as the prayers “[had not] been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” Id. at 794–95. 
 58 Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 275 (identifying Marsh and Town of Greece as the Supreme Court’s 
only decisions addressing legislative prayers); see Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1817 (detailing 
events that gave rise to the Town of Greece plaintiffs’ suit). 
 59 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816. Unlike in Marsh, the clergymen invited to pray at the town 
of Greece’s board meetings did so on a purely voluntary basis. Compare id. (detailing rotating, volun-
teer chaplains from the community offering prayers), with Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85 (identifying the 
practice of paying chaplains). 
 60 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816 (detailing practice of having a “town employee . . . call the 
congregations listed in the local directory until she found a minister available for that month’s meet-
ing”). 
 61 See id. (noting the tone and theme of the prayers). The Court identified that the majority of 
Greece’s congregations, and therefore ministers invited to pray, were Christian. Id. 
 62 Id. at 1817. The District Court for the Western District of New York ruled on summary judgment 
that the town’s prayer practice was constitutional, specifically indicating that the town had not excluded 
any faith from offering prayers, that the benign references to Christianity were not impermissible prose-
lytizing, and that there was no requirement that legislative prayers be purged of sectarian content. Id. The 
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tending that Marsh did not sanction the language and themes used in the town’s 
prayers, and the fact that the prayers took place in town hall meetings forced 
attendants to pretend to join in, or at least stay for the prayers.63 Justice Kenne-
dy’s majority opinion soundly rejected the first argument, finding that nothing in 
Marsh, or any other area of constitutional jurisprudence, premised the constitu-
tionality of prayers on non-sectarian messaging.64 
The current split between the Lund and Bormuth courts arises out of the 
remaining portion of Justice Kennedy’s Town of Greece opinion, which was un-
able to gain the support of a majority of the justices.65 Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
in Part II-B of Town of Greece, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Alito 
joined, indicated a number of factors that, if different, could have been coercive 
in that case.66 In Part II-B, Justice Kennedy specifically indicated that the ques-
tion of coercion in cases involving legislative prayers is fact sensitive, and it is 
that undefined factual analysis that caused the various courts to come to six con-
clusions in Lund and Bormuth.67 Some of the courts focused only on the identity 
                                                                                                                           
Second Circuit reversed, finding that the town’s prayers conveyed the message that it “was endorsing 
Christianity.” Id. at 1818. The Court found that the totality of the circumstances showed the town 
selected prayer givers in a practice that “ensured a Christian viewpoint,” the constantly Christian 
prayers tended to affiliate the town with Christianity, and that the board members’ participation fur-
ther evidenced endorsement of Christianity. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818 (quoting Galloway v. 
Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 30–32 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 63 See id. at 1820 (identifying the plaintiff’s two main arguments being directed at the sectarian 
language of the prayers, and their delivery in the setting of a local government meeting). 
 64 See id. at 1821 (noting that the language the Second Circuit cited from County of Allegheny 
was dicta “that was disputed when written and has been repudiated,” and that the true test for the con-
stitutionality of legislative prayers under Marsh was not related to content, but rather proselytization). 
 65 Id. at 1815. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Part II-B of Town of Greece was joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justice Alito, and contemplates the analysis used to determine whether the prayer practice 
was coercive, which would have made it an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 1815, 1825–26 
(Kennedy, J., delivering the opinion of the court). Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined 
(both of whom joined the majority in all except Part II-B), noted in his concurrence that the coercion 
necessary for an Establishment Clause violation is true legal coercion, not merely a feeling imposed 
by legislators or other that may coerce individuals into participating. Id. at 1838 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 66 Id. at 1825–26 (Kennedy, J., delivering the opinion of the court) (noting that the outcome 
would be different if “board members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out 
dissenters for opprobrium, or indicated their decisions might be influenced by” joining in the prayers 
or not). Justice Thomas’s opinion, on the other hand, discarded the proposition that any non-legal coer-
cion could ever serve as grounds for an Establishment Clause claim, stating instead that only “actual legal 
coercion” could support such a claim. Id. at 1837–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). Justice Thomas defined “actual legal coercion” as “financial support of the church, 
compel[led] religious observance, or control[led] religious doctrine” by the government. Id. at 1837. 
 67 See Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 516–19 (performing the analysis proscribed in Justice Kennedy’s 
Town of Greece plurality opinion); Lund III, 863 F.3d at 281 (noting that the fact that board members 
wrote and delivered the prayers “interacts with the other aspects of the county’s practice, altering their 
constitutional significant”); Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 282, 285 (examining the factual significance of 
the identity of the prayer-giver, the government’s actions related to the prayers both before and after 
deliverance of the prayers, and the government’s treatment of those that object to the prayers); Lund 
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of the prayer-giver, relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent to address other 
facts surrounding the prayers, whereas other courts examined anew all the facts 
involved.68 
C. Bormuth III and Lund III’s Divergent Analysis 
The Courts in Lund III and Bormuth III both began their analysis of the 
challenged prayer practices by analyzing whether or not the prayers at issue fell 
within the area of historically constitutional prayers.69 Even in that preliminary 
question, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits took divergent views of the types of leg-
islative prayers sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Marsh and Town of 
Greece.70 The two courts continued to diverge in their analysis as they proceeded 
to determine whether the prayers in question were coercive.71 Based on that di-
vergent analysis, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits came to opposite conclusions, 
with the Fourth Circuit deciding that the prayers were coercive and fell outside 
                                                                                                                           
II, 837 F.3d at 420–25 (noting that the identity of the prayer-giver, the selection of the prayers content, 
and the purpose of the prayers are all relevant considerations); Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 3d. at 858 
(indicating that the constitutional determination “hinges exclusively on the fact that the prayer[s] 
[were] delivered by the Commissioners”); Lund I, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 721–24 (detailing all facts that 
distinguish Rowan County’s prayers from those in Town of Greece). 
 68 Compare Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 509 (noting the inquiry regarding legislative prayers focuses 
on “the prayer opportunity as a whole, in light of historical practices”), with Bormuth I, 116 F. Supp. 
3d at 858 (noting the factual analysis makes the constitutional determination “hinge[] exclusively on 
the fact that the prayer[s] [were] delivered by the Commissioners”). 
 69 See Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 509 (stating that “at the heart of this appeal is whether Jackson 
County’s prayer practice falls outside [of] our historically accepted traditions”); Lund III, 863 F.3d at 
279 (beginning by addressing the question of whether Rowan County’s prayers fit within the histori-
cal practice of legislative prayers, based on statistics provided by the County and amici). 
 70 Compare Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 509 (noting that Marsh independently approved both “paid 
legislative chaplains and opening prayers,” and that neither Marsh nor Town of Greece limit the his-
torical practice to a question of who gives the prayers), with Lund III, 863 F.3d at 277–78 (stating that 
Town of Greece “does not address legislator-led prayer[s]” because it “takes for granted the use of 
outside clergy” to lead prayers). 
 71 Compare Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 507–08 (finding no significant difference between the coer-
cion in Town of Greece and the coercion in the case at bar, no significant difference between the re-
quests to join in prayers by Commissioners and those by ministers, and finding no significance in the 
act of several board members turning their backs on Mr. Bormuth as he spoke against the prayers), 
with Lund III, 863 F.3d at 286–88 (noting the significant difference between requests to join in pray-
ers from ministers and Commissioners, the difference in coercive effect of prayers offered by Com-
missioners, and the coercive effect of prayers in a local government meeting with other members of 
the public participating). The Bormuth III court declined to decide whether Justice Kennedy or Justice 
Thomas’s coercion analysis was the proper coercion test, stating instead that the prayers would be 
coercive under either theory of coercion. See 870 F.3d at 515–16 (noting that “because Bormuth’s 
challenge fails under either standard, we need not resolve this issue”). On the other hand, although the 
Lund III court did not specifically state that it was applying Justice Kennedy’s coercion analysis, it 
cited heavily to the areas of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that gave examples of when practices would 
become coercive. See 863 F.3d at 285–87 (citing Justice Kennedy’s guidance on legislators “sig-
nal[ing] disfavor toward non-Christians” and legislative instructions to participate in the prayers). 
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the historical practice of legislative prayer, while the Sixth Circuit determined 
the prayers were not coercive and in line with history.72 
III. FAITHFULLY PERFORMING A COMPLETE FACTUAL  
ANALYSIS IN COERCION INQUIRIES 
The Sixth Circuit failed to faithfully apply Supreme Court precedent to the 
factual circumstances of the prayers in Bormuth III when it found the prayers 
constitutional.73 Specifically, the Bormuth III court employed dicta from the plu-
rality opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway, which stated that adults could 
withstand exposure to differing religious ideas by their local government through 
guest chaplains to reach the same conclusions about prayers offered by those 
government officials, preceded by instructions to participate.74 The court also 
indicated that Marsh v. Chambers endorsed legislative prayers and paid chap-
lains separately, although in reality Marsh considered the historical prevalence of 
legislative prayers with the limiting function of it’s performance by a paid chap-
lain.75 Finally, the Bormuth III court held that, in light of Town of Greece, there 
was no difference in prayers in local government meetings and larger state or 
national legislatures, despite the fact that Town of Greece stated that proposition 
in the context of prayers delivered by invitees.76 By analyzing the array of facts 
surrounding the challenged prayer practice, similar to the court’s analysis in 
Bormuth II, the Lund III court faithfully performed the detailed factual analysis 
required in analyzing Establishment Clause claims.77 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 497–98 (finding Jackson County’s prayers in line with Supreme 
Court precedent and constitutional, and that the prayers were not coercive under any version of coer-
cion analysis); Lund III, 863 F.3d at 272 (finding Rowan County’s prayers unconstitutional and noting 
the coercive effect of the prayers on the members of the public present at the Board of Commissioners 
meetings). 
 73 See Bormuth III, 870 F.3d 494, 507–10, 516 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (relying on erroneously 
stated Supreme Court precedent and findings from different factual scenarios rather than conducting 
its own analysis). 
 74 See id. at 516 (noting that Town of Greece required a finding that the coercive effect of prayers 
given at local government meetings was no different than the coercive effect of prayers given at legis-
lative sessions, without reference to Town of Greece’s consideration of the prayer-giver being an in-
vitee). 
 75 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88 (1983) (noting that “opening [legislative] ses-
sions with a prayer offered by a paid chaplain” began as early as 1774 in the Continental Congress); 
Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 510 (indicating that, in Marsh, the Supreme Court recognized both “paid 
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as consistent with . . . the Establishment Clause”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 76 See Town of Greece v. Galloway 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824–25 (2014) (finding no difference be-
tween the prayers offered in the town of Greece and historically protected prayers in that they were 
both “directed at” members of the board); Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 516 (noting that Town of Greece 
mandates finding no difference between prayers at local meetings and legislative sessions). 
 77 See Lund III, 863 F.3d 268, 281–82 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (performing detailed recitation of 
the facts of the Rowan County prayer practice, including a comparison of the control and content of 
the prayers to the open and inclusive prayer practice approved by the Supreme Court in Town of 
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First, looking to Supreme Court precedent it is clear that the question of 
faithfulness to the Establishment Clause cannot turn on one fact alone, but rather 
requires careful consideration of all factors surrounding the challenged prayers.78 
The fact sensitive nature of that analysis, which was recognized in Town of 
Greece, Lund, and Bormuth, necessitates an in depth analysis of all of the facts 
surrounding a challenged practice, rather than merely those that the Supreme 
Court has not previously addressed.79 The Bormuth III court failed to perform 
that in depth analysis when it imported Supreme Court precedent to limit it’s 
analysis.80 Looking to the prior decisions in Lund and Bormuth, the factual anal-
ysis performed by the circuit court in Bormuth III is an insufficient attempt at 
weighing the interplay of factors relevant to a constitutional determination.81 
Even the Lund II decision, which for a time upheld similar prayers, does not con-
template an analysis that would so easily cast aside relevant factors and turn 
primarily on the prayer-giver’s identity.82 
                                                                                                                           
Greece); Bormuth II, 849 F.3d 266, 285–87 (6th Cir. 2016) (giving special attention to the Board’s 
practice of directing participation in the prayers, criticizing those that did not participate, and “in-
dicat[ing] that their decisions might be influenced by” participation in the prayers, as required under 
Town of Greece). 
 78 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825–28 (detailing numerous facts about Greece’s prayer 
practice, including what the prayers said, who gave the prayers, and when the prayers took place). The 
Supreme Court’s most recent foray into legislative prayers involved a detailed resuscitation of the 
facts surrounding the challenged prayers, including the content of the prayer, the prayer-giver’s identi-
ty, and when the prayers were given. See id. The Court also specifically noted that the coercion in-
quiry in cases involving legislative prayers “remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the set-
ting in which the prayer[s] arises and the audience to whom it is directed.” Id. at 1825. 
 79 See id. at 1825.(describing legislative prayer inquiries as “fact-sensitive”); Lund III, 863 F.3d 
at 280–81 (recognizing that a court looking into a challenge to legislative prayers must examine the 
“prayer opportunity as a whole” and perform a “fact-sensitive review” of those prayers); Bormuth II, 
849 F.3d at 285 (noting that Establishment Clause analysis of legislative prayers is a “fact-sensitive 
one”). 
 80 See Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 516 (noting that “consistent with Town of Greece,” the court 
would not view the coercive effect of prayers at local government meetings differently than those at 
legislative sessions, without recognizing that the Town of Greece finding was based on prayers given 
by invited clergy). Compare Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816 (detailing prayers delivered by invit-
ed ministers and the public), with Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 269–70 (detailing Jackson County’s prac-
tice of maintaining Commissioner control over the prayers by delivering all the prayers). 
 81 Compare Bormuth III, 870 F.3d at 516 (noting that the fact that the prayers were delivered in a 
local government meeting by government officials is immaterial to the constitutional outcome of the 
case), with Bormuth II, 849 F.3d at 282, 285 (discussing the importance of considering both the pray-
er-giver’s identity and the fact that the prayers took place in an intimate, local government setting), 
and Lund I, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 722–23 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (noting the importance of the prayer-
giver’s identity, as well as the implications of commissioner, and by proxy the government, determin-
ing the content of the prayers). 
 82 See Lund II, 837 F.3d 407, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that a decision by “the Board restrict[ing] 
the prayer opportunity among the commissioners as part of an effort to promote only Christianity” would 
raise constitutionally significant questions). That evidence is present in the Bormuth cases, as shown by a 
member of the Jackson County Board of Commissioners’ public comments that the prayers were limited 
to Commissioners based on the statements public prayer-givers would make. See Bormuth II, 849 F.3d 
at 283 (detailing comments made by a Commissioner that opening the prayers to the public would 
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On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit’s factual analysis in Lund III applies 
the correct factual analysis to determine the constitutionality of the prayers in 
Rowan County.83 Rather than relying on the Supreme Court’s previous findings 
on the factual implications of prayers in a town meeting setting, or of the public 
being asked to stand, the Lund III court engaged in a new factual analysis, taking 
into consideration the facts that distinguish Lund from Town of Greece.84 The 
Lund III court specifically, and correctly, considered the identity of the prayer 
giver, the board members’ deliberate choice to exercise control over prayers with 
constant Christian messages, and the exact language of the prayers used to 
proselytize.85 The Lund III court thereby remained faithful to Town of Greece’s 
instruction to perform independent analysis in every legislative prayer case.86 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit conducted an incomplete 
factual analysis to hold unconstitutionally coercive prayers constitutional in 
Bormuth III. The court’s approach to its analysis of the Jackson County Board of 
Commissioners’ prayer practice strayed from the analysis mandated by Supreme 
Court precedent, which was dutifully followed by the courts in Bormuth II and 
Lund III. Without reference to the bigger picture of the facts of the practice, the 
Bormuth III court used Supreme Court precedent analyzing a different factual 
scenario to shorten its only analysis. By disregarding the interplay between facts 
when determining coercion, the Bormuth III court failed to abide by precedent, 
which was correctly followed in Lund III. 
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“create a lot of problems . . . when certain people come up here and say things that they are not going 
to like”). 
 83 See Lund III, 863 F.3d at 277–79 (comparing and contrasting all relevant facts from Rowan 
County’s prayer practice to those the Court addressed in Marsh and Town of Greece). 
 84 See id. at 281–85 (detailing all facts relevant to prayers conducted at meetings of the Rowan 
County Board of Commissioners, and examining those facts against the backdrop of historic prayer 
practices to determine the constitutionality of those prayers). 
 85 See id. at 277, 282, 284–85 (noting that the Supreme Court has only “discussed legislative 
prayer practices in terms of invited ministers, clergy, or volunteers,” that the board members, all of 
whom were Protestant Christians, only allowed themselves to pray at meetings, and noting that the 
prayers used asked “that the world may believe that you sent Jesus to save us” and indicated Jesus 
Christ as “the one and only way to salvation”). 
 86 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (noting the importance of an inquiry that considers both 
the setting and audience of the prayers); Lund III, 863 F.3d at 287–88 (noting the timing of the deliv-
ery of the prayers and indicating that the prayers were directed at the public). 
